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NOTE
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL PROXY
RULES: REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES
Consonant with the fundamental purpose of the federal securities
laws to protect investors,' section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 was designed to buttress shareholder suffrage rights by ensuring
the integrity of the proxy solicitation process.2 The language of the
section3 and its attendant legislative history4 evidence the judgment of
1. Securities laws were enacted primarily "to substitute a philosophy of full dis-
closure for the philosophy of caveat emptor." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
2. "A proxy is nothing more than the agency created when a shareholder authorizes
the proxy holder to cast the votes, to which the shareholder is entitled through his
stock ownership, at a corporate meeting." Von Mehren & McCarroll, The Proxy Rules:
A Case Study in the Administrative Process, 29 LAw & CONiEMP. PaOB. 728, 729 (1964).
In contrast to most agencies, the agent (solicitor) in the proxy situation has more
information than does his principal (shareholder); it is this distortion which makes
possible the abuses which section 14(a) was designed to correct. Id. See generally Axe,
Corporate Proxies, 41 MicIH. L. REv. 38, 225 (1942).
8. Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national
securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to
Section 12 of this title.
Although the Commission has promulgated numerous rules relating to the proxy so-
licitation process, discussion in this Note will be limited to SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1973), which provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the
light of circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or neces-
sary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to
the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which
has become false or misleading.
4. The legislative history, although less than replete, indicates congressional aware-
ness of the need to afford protection to the shareholder in every transaction which
requires his approval. See H.R. RE.P. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934);
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its drafters that full and fair disclosure in proxy solicitations is an es-
sential safeguard of a system of informed corporate suffrage.5
In J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,6 the Supreme Court observed: "The pur-
pose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate
disclosure in proxy solicitation." Prevention of abuse is crucial to the
integrity of the proxy solicitation process; indeed, the primary enforce-
ment device of the Securities Exchange Act is the injunction. Section
21 (e) s empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
institute suit in the federal district courts to enjoin activities or practices
"which constitute or will constitute" violations of the Act.
Although the right of an individual investor to enforce the provisions
of section 14(a) through the rules promulgated pursuant thereto was
not explicitly articulated in the Act, it had become apparent by 1964
that the SEC, acting alone, was unable effectively to prevent proxy
abuses.9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Borak held that the avail-
ability of derivative and representative actions by individual shareholders
was implied by section 14(a) as a "necessary supplement" to SEC en-
forcement. 10 Furthermore, the Court, recognizing that effective en-
S. Rsa. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). The possibility for abuse in a proxy
contest was specifically recognized:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Com-
mission will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies,
on the one hand by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of. a
corporation away from honest and conscientious corporation officials; and,
on the other hand, by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to retain con-
trol of the management by concealing and distorting facts.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
5. See Cohen, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 20 FED. B.J. 91, 98 (1960): "The primary
underlying concept of the proxy rules-consistent with the philosophy of, the statute-is
that of disclosure."
6. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
7. Id. at 431 (emphasis supplied).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). Those who violate the Act are also subject to criminal
sanctions. Securities Exchange Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970). Resort to criminal
prosecution under section 32, however, has been infrequent. For one of the few
successful criminal actions, see United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12 (SD.N.Y 1960)
(failure to file proxy statements with the Commission).
9. By 1964, over 2,000 proxy statements were being filed annually with the SEC.
The Borak Court recognized the Commission's inability to review effectively each
statement, noting: "Time does not permit an independent examination of the facts
set out in the proxy material and this results in the Commission's acceptance of the
representations contained therein at their face value . .. ." 377 U.S. at 432.
10. Id. at 431-32. The precise question in Borak was whether section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), authorizes a federal cause of action
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forcement of the proxy rules would be enhanced if a wide range of
remedies were available for violations, sanctioned retrospective as well
as prospective relief.1
Borak firmly established a private right of action for violations of the
proxy rules and the availability of wide-ranging remedies to redress
such violations; however, the specific formulation of remedies was left
to the district courts.' 2 The three forms of relief generally articulated
are injunction, rescission, and compensatory damages.' 3 The paucity
of damage awards and the complete absence of successful actions for
rescission suggest that these two remedies are ill suited to redress the
majority of section 14(a) violations. Moreover, although the SEC has
achieved marked success in obtaining injunctions, 4 courts have exhibited
reluctance to afford similar relief in actions brought by individual share-
holders.' 5
This Note will analyze each of these remedies in terms of its efficacy
in preventing or redressing section 14(a) violations. It would appear
that retrospective relief in the form of compensatory damages or rescis-
sion generally is inappropriate in the context of proxy solicitation abuses
and that in order to guarantee informed corporate suffrage and the
concomitant integrity of the proxy solicitation process, injunctive relief
should be more accessible to the aggrieved shareholder than is presently
the case. Before testing this hypothesis, a brief discussion of the develop-
ment of the right of individuals to sue for proxy rule violations and an
analysis of the elements necessary to state a cause of action under section
14(a) are warranted.
for damages or rescission by an individual shareholder for violations of section 14(a).
Section 27 grants to the district courts jurisdiction of "all suits in equity and actions
at law to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder.'
11. 377 U.S. at 433-35. Implicit in its holding that retrospective relief should be
available to redress violations of the rules was the Court's realization that inadequate
disclosure could not be prevented in every instance.
12. The Court in Borak observed that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."
Id. at 433.
13. Although the primary thrust of this Note will be an analysis of the efficacy of
these remedies, the possibility of awarding punitive damages or attorneys' fees in
actions for proxy rule violations will also be considered. See notes 101-25 infra & ac-
companying text.
14. From 1934 through 1971, the SEC brought 1,993 injunctive actions against 7,600
named defendants for various securities law violations. In 92 percent of these cases, the
Commission was successful against at least one of the named defendants. SECURTIES &
EXCHANGw Comm'N, TIRTY-SEvENTH ANNUAL REPORT 226 (1971).
15. See notes 155-67 infra & accompanying text.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted to prevent a re-
currence of the financial devastation suffered by private investors in the
wake of the 1929 stock market crash.'6 Full disclosure to the investor
of all material facts surrounding securities transactions was envisioned
as the primary means of protection. One commentator has characterized
the proxy rules promulgated by the SEC under section 14(a) as "very like-
ly the most effective disclosure device in the SEC scheme of things." 17
Specifically, SEC Rule 14a-9 proscribes the solicitation of proxies by
means of a proxy statement which is materially false or misleading.
Although the Commission was statutorily empowered to enforce its
rules through actions for injunctions' or criminal sanctions, 9 the ex-
istence of private enforcement rights remained unsettled in the federal
courts until Borak.2 1
The leading case denying the existence of such rights was Howard v.
Fur;st,21 in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned
16. See, e.g., Hanna & Trulington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 251 (1935); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 32 MicH. L. Riv. 1025 (1934); 51 IovA L. REv. 515 (1966).
17. 2 L. Loss, SECURTMEs REmuLATmoN 1027 (2d ed. 1961). Professor Loss observes:
'The proxy literature, unlike the application for registration and the statutory reports,
gets into the hands of. investors. Unlike the Securities Act prospectus, it gets there in
time. It is more readable than any of these other documents. And it gets to a good
many people who never see a prospectus." Id.
18. Securities Exchange Act § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970), provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute
a violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon
a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining
order shall be granted -without bond ....
19. Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a) (1970), provides for a
maximum $10,000 fine and/or two years' imprisonment upon conviction for willful
violation of any provision of the Act, or any rule or regulation thereunder. See note
8 supra.
20. Cases prior to Borak which recognized a right to private enforcement of. the
proxy rules include Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D.
11. 1964); Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Dunn v. Decca
Records, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Phillips v. United Corp., 5 S.E.C. Jud.
Dec. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Tate v. Sonotone Corp, 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1947). A private right of action was denied in Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957); Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F. Supp. 753
(S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
21. 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
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that congressional failure to articulate specifically a substantive civil
right on behalf of a corporation enforceable in a derivative action by a
shareholder negated its existence. Rejecting this rationale, the Supreme
Court held in Borak that private enforcement was indispensable to ful-
fillment of the "broad remedial purposes" of the legislation.2 2 Referring
to the congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history," the
Court observed that one of the primary purposes of section 14(a) was
the protection of investors, "which certainly implies the availability of
judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." 24 Prior to the
passage of the Act, Congress had recognized that "[flair corporate
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security
bought on a public exchange." 25 The Supreme Court found private
enforcement rights implicit in the Act as a necessary supplement to
the enforcement mechanism articulated therein. The threat of private
action was envisioned as an additional deterrent to proxy violations. The
Court also recognized that since substantive and procedural roadblocks
inhibit effective stockholder action in state courts, 26 the full power of the
federal judiciary acting under section 14(a) is required to provide
necessary relief.27
Despite the seemingly broad mandate in Borak, individuals, whether
bringing suit in a derivative or representative capacity, have, with few
exceptions, been unable to establish a violation or, having proved a
violation, to secure an appropriate remedy. Failure to state a cause of
22. 377 U.S. at 431-32.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
24. 377 U.S. at 432 (emphasis supplied).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). As enacted in 1934, the
Act applied only to companies whose securities were registered on the national ex-
changes. The coverage was broadened by the Securities Act Amendments of 1964
to include all companies having assets in excess of $1,000,000 and a class of equity
security held of. record by 500 persons or more. Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), 15
U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
26. State procedural rules concerning joinder of necessary parties and requiring
security for expenses often present insurmountable obstacles. Moreover, the plaintiff
bringing suit under section 14(a) arguably has a lighter burden of proof than does
his counterpart relying on a common law or state statutory cause of action. "Ap-
parently a stronger showing of. fraud may be required when an injunction is sought
under state law than when it is sought for a violation of SEC Proxy Rule 14a-9 forbid-
ding false or misleading statements." E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR
COPOATE CONTROL 485 (2d ed. 1968).
27. 377 U.S. at 433-35.
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action has often precluded trial on the merits, and summary judgment
for defendant on the pleadings has been a typical result.28
THE SECTION 14(A) CAUSE OF AcTIoN
Elements frequently articulated as necessary to state a cause of action
under section 14(a) include a solicitation,2 9 a false or misleading state-
ment or omission,3" materiality, and causation. Although there have been
occasional difficulties in applying the first two of these elements, the
meaning and interrelationship of materiality and causation have been
particularly troublesome to the courts. An examination of recent de-
velopments with respect to these two elements provides a helpful back-
ground for a discussion of remedies.
28. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Washburn
v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 340 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Prettner v.
Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1972); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434
(ED. Mo. 1971); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kaminsky
v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc, 285 F.
Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett
v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
29. SEC Rule 14a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1973), defines solicitation as "(i) any
request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a form of proxy;
(ii) any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or (iii) the
furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under
circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revo-
cation of a proxy:' In order for a solicitation to be subject to the proxy rules, the
jurisdictional requirements of section 12 must be met. Securities Exchange Act § 12,
15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970). For cases construing the term "solicitation," see Brown v.
Chicago, Rock I. & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964); Washburn v. Madison
Square Garden Corp., 340 F. Supp. 504 (SD.N.Y. 1972); Allied Artists Pictures Corp.
v. D. Kaltman & Co., 283 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago &
N.V. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955).
30. Whether a proxy statement is false or misleading normally depends upon the
facts of each case. In a note appended to rule 14a-9, the SEC indicates the following
examples of what may be considered misleading:
(a) Predictions as to specific future market values, earnings, or dividends.
(b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity
or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning
improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factual foun-
dation. (c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy and
other soliciting material as to clearly distinguish it from the soliciting ma-
terial of any other person or persons soliciting for the same meeting or sub-
ject matter. (d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a
solicitation.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973).
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Materiality
Only those statements or omissions which render a proxy solicitation
materially false or misleading violate section 14(a). 1 The materiality
of a defect is normally a determination of fact, but if reasonable minds
could not reach different conclusions, a court may find a defect to be
material as a matter of law.32 What actually constitutes a material defect,
however, has been a matter of dispute. Addressing this issue in Alills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co.,33 the Supreme Court employed the following
frequently cited 4 language: "Where the misstatement or omission in
a proxy statement has been shown to be 'material,' ... that determination
itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a
character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable
shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote." 15 Other
courts have stated that a material defect is one which "would influence
the stockholder's vote," 36 or which "would normally be expected to
influence a reasonable stockholder in voting." 37 Also frequently quoted
is the articulation by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that
materiality is established when, "taking a properly realistic view, there
is a substantial likelihood that the misstatement or omission may have
led a stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to withhold one
31. Material defects have been found in Henwood v. SEC, 298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962); SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); Beatty v.
Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (SD. Idwa 1971); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose
Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (ED. Pa. 1970); Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031
(ND. IMI. 1970); SEC v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). For cases
finding the defects not to be material, see Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne,
Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.
Mo. 1971); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.DJ".Y. 1967).
32. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
33. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
34. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971);
Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (SD. Iowa 1970); Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp.
1031 (ND. 111. 1970). See generally Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions
for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 136 (1970); 21 CASE V. REs. L. Rv. 787,
795 (1970).
35. 396 U.S. at 384 (emphasis supplied).
36. Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 274 (SD.N.Y. 1967). See also Crane Co.
v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Evans v. Armour, 241
F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
37. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The Richland
court also phrased its definition of materiality in terms of information "that a stock-
holder might reasonably need in order to make an intelligent decision with respect to
the proposal?' Id.
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from the other side, whereas in the absence of this he would have taken
a contrary course." 38
A majority of recent decisions, in testing the seriousness of an alleged
misstatement in or omission from proxy materials, have relied upon the
lills language.3 9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however,
has rejected the proposition that Mills contains a definition of materiality.
In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,40 it was concluded that although
the Mills Court held that a showing of materiality would establish the
necessary causal connection between a proxy rule violation and share-
holder injury without a further showing of causation in fact, no attempt
had been made to define a standard by which materiality must be judged.
The "might have been considered important" language in Mills was
described as merely suggestive of the "minimum that all would agree
was 'embodied' in the district court's conclusion that the defect was
material." 41
The Gerstle court suggested that the seriousness of a defect is more
properly tested by a standard tending toward probability rather than
mere possibility; accordingly, in the Second Circuit materiality is to be
judged by whether a defect is such that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important.42 The court added: "While the difference be-
tween 'might' and 'would' may seem gossamer, the former is too sug-
gestive of mere possibility, however unlikely." 43 Other courts, how-
ever, draw no such distinction and, in fact, have termed the two tests
indistinguishable.44
Notwithstanding the persuasive argument in Gerstle that no defini-
tion of materiality was attempted by the Supreme Court in Mills,45 it is
38. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). Two cases decided under SEC Rule 10b-5 applied
substantially the same test. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc, 340 F.2d
457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
39. See, e.g., Allen v. Penn Cent. Co, 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Puma v.
Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18 (D. Del. 1972); Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del.
1972); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Berman v. Thomson,
312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
40. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 1301.
42. The Gerstle court adhered to the test for materiality articulated in General Time
Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969). See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
43. 478 F.2d at 1302.
44. See, e.g, Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
45. The Gerstle court stated that the sole issue addressed in Mills was whether a
19731
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apparent that Mills did establish parameters within -which a determina-
tion of materiality must be made. The Court rejected as unduly bur-
densome any approach -which requires an affirmative showing that a
defect in the proxy solicitation "actually had a decisive effect on the
voting." 46 A test 'which focuses upon the seriousness of the defect it-
self rather than upon the effect of such defect on the outcome of the
vote indeed appears more useful. As the Court observed in Mills: "This
objective test will avoid the impracticalities of determining how many
votes 'were affected and, by resolving doubts in favor of those the
statute was designed to protect, will effectuate the congressional policy
of ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an informed choice
when they are consulted on corporate transactions." 47
Thus, although the Supreme Court may not have articulated a precise
and authoritative definition of materiality, it has at least suggested the
proper approach. Materiality does not encompass "trivial" defects but
rather those which have a "significant propensity to affect the voting
process .... ,,41 A test which emphasizes the effect of a particular state-
ment or omission upon a shareholder's decisionmaking process, and not
the effect upon the decision itself, addresses the controlling issue of
whether a shareholder has received sufficient information to make an
intelligent decision. Framed differently, the ultimate issue is whether a
solicitor of proxies has fully and accurately disclosed all facts necessary
to enable the shareholder to exercise an informed vote. An approach
which focuses upon the actual decision precludes a determination of
materiality in situations in which a defective proxT statement did not
in fact cause a shareholder to vote differently and disregards the thrust
of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9, 'which mandate examination of the
shareholder must prove that a false or misleading statement in the proxy materials
actually caused the shareholders to approve a merger. The Mills Court's holding was
described as limited to a determination that causation in fact is not required under
section 14(a) and that a finding that proxy materials were materially false or mis-
leading establishes the requisite causation between a violation and shareholder injury.
Thus, according to Gerstle, the Court in Mills never attempted to define the standard
to be applied in measuring the seriousness of a defect.
46. 396 U.S. at 384-85; accord, Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. 697, 702
(E.D. Pa. 1972) ("The central question is not whether the defect actually had a
decisive effect, but rather whether it has a 'significant propensity to affect the voting
process. ").
47. 396 U.S. at 385 (emphasis supplied).
48. Id. at 384. In Gerstle, the court favored the "sianificant propensity" lanua!e as
tending to a test of probability rather than possibility. However, the Mills Court
employed this language to describe what was meant bV the district court's use of the
"might have been considered important" language. If judged by a significant propensity
yardstick, the "might" and "would" tests are similar, if not identical.
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means employed in seeking shareholder approval for a corporate
transaction. Indeed, the teaching of Mills is that any approach to ma-
teriality which requires a showing of causation in fact must be avoided.
It is submitted that whether a test of materiality is phrased in terms of
"might influence" or "would influence" is unimportant, so long as the
focus of the inquiry is upon the significant propensity of a defect to
affect the voting process. The materiality requirement should be satis-
fied if it is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence in a section 14(a)
civil action at law or by clear and convincing evidence in a suit in equity,
that defects in proxy materials would have a significant propensity to
affect the decisionmaking process of the reasonable shareholder.
The success of shareholder actions for violations of proxy solicitation
rules, however, has not depended entirely on a showing that a violation
is material. Despite the significant inroads made by the Supreme Court
in Mills, aspects of the issue of causation remain unsettled and trouble-
some.
Causation
A "but for" test posits the most stringent standard of causation.
Courts utilizing this approach prior to Mills required that a plaintiff
allege and prove that but for the defective proxy statement, there would
have been sufficient stockholder votes against the proposal to prevent
approval of the transaction.49 Other courts had held that the requisite
causation was established if "substantial probability" existed that the
proxy misstatements or omissions were determinative of the outcome of
the vote; 0 the necessity of proving that a certain percentage of share-
49. See, e.g., Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (SD.N.Y. 1965). A distinc-
tion should be drawn between two types of causation. The first, reliance causation,
goes directly to the cause of action, that is, a nexus must be shown between the
proxT solicitation and the accomplishment of the transaction. The second, damage
causation, speaks to remedy and requires a causal link between the defective solicitation
and the damages which a shareholder is seeking to recover.
Sometimes, as in Barnett, the two types of causation are not distinguished, and the
failure to show damages has defeated a cause of action. The fact that money damages
cannot be shown, however, should not preclude a finding that a violation has occurred.
Their absence in a particular case is, of course, significant in fashioning an appropriate
remedy for a violation, but to equate all shareholder injury with monetary harm is
unwarranted. See notes 88-89 infra & accompanying text. Given the above distinction,
the textual discussion has been limited to the necessity of reliance causation in a section
14(a) cause of action.
50. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc, 298 F. Supp. 66 (ED.N.Y. 1969),
modified, 332 F. Supp. 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), 7odified, 348 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd as modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago
& N.,. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (ND. Il. 1964).
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holders in fact voted in reliance on the proxy statement was viewed as
an impossible burden. A third test stated that the causal nexus was
satisfied if the solicitation served some function in the transaction.'
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.52 resolved the conflict over the causa-
tion element in cases in which a proposed transaction cannot be effected
without solicitation of proxies. In Mills, shareholders of Electric Auto-
Lite Company had sought to enjoin the voting of proxies in favor of a
proposed merger with the Mergenthaler Linotype Company. The
complaint, however, did not request a temporary restraining order, and
the voting proceeded as scheduled. Upon approval by the necessary
two-thirds vote, the merger was consummated. In an amended com-
plaint, petitioners sought, inter alia, rescission of the merger. The com-
plaint alleged that the proxy statement violated rule 14a-9 in failing to
disclose that all of Auto-Lite's directors were nominated or controlled
by Mergenthaler, which owned over 50 percent of the outstanding shares
of the Auto-Lite common stock.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit53 agreed with
the district court 4 that the proxy statement was materially defective,
the appellate tribunal ruled that evidence of the fairness of the merger
terms could be presented to demonstrate that the merger would have
been approved regardless of defects in the proxy materials. The Supreme
Court, rejecting this approach, held that a judicial determination of the
fairness of the merger could not be substituted for the stockholders' in-
formed vote. It was noted that to hold otherwise would obstruct the
shareholders' right to challenge fraudulent proxies and would denigrate
the congressional purpose of ensuring informed corporate suffrage.5
The Court held that in those instances in which the proxies solicited
are necessary to obtain shareholder approval of the transaction, a finding
of materiality need not be supplemented with proof that the defect
affected the outcome of the vote. It was reasoned that "where there has
been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing
of causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which
he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself,
rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an es-
sential link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 51 The "but for"
51. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
52. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
53. 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
54. 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
55. 396 U.S. at 381.
56. Id. at 385.
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test was rejected, the Court observing: "Use of a solicitation that is
materially misleading is itself a violation of law .... ,, 57
Aills thus stands for the proposition that a cause of action under sec-
tion 14(a) and rule 14a-9 is established upon a showing that a false or
misleading statement or omission in a proxy statement is material. This
holding, however, is limited to those instances in which approval of a
corporate transaction is impossible without solicitation of additional
votes.5
8
Two conflicting positions have developed with respect to the issue,
explicitly left unanswered by the Mills Court,50 whether it is possible
to establish a causal connection between defective proxy materials and
shareholder injury in those instances in which approval of a transaction
could have been accomplished without soliciting proxies. Several courts
have required mathematical proof of the causal nexus between a proxy
violation and shareholder approval. Under this approach, if a defendant
controls shares sufficient in number to accomplish a corporate transac-
tion without soliciting minority shareholder approval, the fact that
minority shareholders were solicited by means of a defective proxy
statement is irrelevent. Thus, it has been held that if "the corporate
action allegedly causing the damages would in any event have occurred
regardless of the statements made in the proxy solicitation, the claim,
insofar as it is based on § 14(a), must be dismissed." 60
The leading case applying this mathematical "but for" test of causa-
tion is Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,61 in which a private claim under rule
14a-9 was dismissed because plaintiff owned insufficient shares to alter
57. Id. at 383. For consideration of. whether the Mills "presumption" of causation
may be rebutted, see Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Viola-
tions, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 135-38 (1970).
58. For example, if a favorable vote by two-thirds of the outstanding shares is re-
quired to obtain approval for a corporate transaction, Mills specifically applies only
in cases in which the solicitor owns or controls less than two-thirds of the outstanding
shares.
59. 396 U.S. at 385 n.7.
60. Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 824, 828 (SD.N.Y. 1969).
61. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Plaintiff, minority shareholder of a corpora-
tion in which the defendant corporation had held 73 percent of the stock, alleged that
the proxT statement used in the process of acquisition by defendant of the assets of
his corporation was violative of rule 14a-9. The earnings and book value comparisons
of the two companies were allegedly distorted so as to permit the acquisition of the
assets for inadequate consideration. Plaintiff also alleged that the transaction caused
the loss of stock appraisal rights. The complaint sought an accounting to determine
true value of the shares and recovery of the amounts by which defendant had been
unjustly enriched.
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the outcome of the vote. Defendant proxy solicitor owned over 73 per-
cent of the outstanding stock when only a two-thirds favorable vote
was needed to obtain approval. In such circumstances, according to
the Barnett court, "there is no question of fact as to causal relationship
between the proxy material and the transaction under attack. The 'but
for' element-the element of causation-does not, and indeed, could not
exist." 62
Laurenzano 4v. Einbender2 is illustrative of the contrary view. Al-
though the facts were similar to those in Barnett in that the solicitor
owned sufficient shares to obtain approval of the transaction without
soliciting additional votes, the court refused to dismiss the complaint
for lack of causation, stating that causation is established upon a show-
ing that the proxy materials have "a transactional function and [are]
not merely. .. randomly present in the context of the transaction with
respect to which a remedy is sought." 64 The fact that the outcome of
a vote is mathematically inevitable was held not to be dispositive. The
court observed: "Although the proxy solicitation was not a necessary
or indispensable ingredient of the execution of the transactions, it was
calculatedly infused into the matrix of the transactions; it cannot now
be said as a matter of law that the solicitation was not an integral part
of the transactions and that it was functionless in the consummation of
the transaction." 65
The Barnett approach has met with substantial criticism. In Swanson
v. American Consumer Industries, Inc.,66 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit rejected a mechanical test of causation, stating: "To
apply the Barnett rationale . . . would be to sanction all manner of
fraud and overreaching in the fortuitous circumstance that a controlling
shareholder exists." 67 Indeed, there is some doubt whether the Barnett
62. Id. at 771.
63. 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). Shareholders in Retail Centers of the Americas,
Inc. brought suit alleging that the defendants employed deceptive proxy materials
in obtaining shareholder approval for the sale of Retail's assets. It should be noted that
Laurenzano and Barnett were decided by different district courts within the Second
Circuit.
64. Id. at 360.
65. Id. at 361. The court added: "The meeting does not become nugatory and dis-
pensable because one shareholder owns enough shares to carry any resolution and can
be expected to vote in favor of, his own resolutions. The vote is not legally prede-
termined simply because it is practically predictable." Id. at 362.
66. 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
67. Id. at 1331. The court in Swanson was dealing with an alleged violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and SEC Rule 10b-5
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
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approach remains valid in the Second Circuit.6" The district court in
Laurenzano had dismissed the action for failure to prove a material
violation. The court of appeals, although affirming the trial court's
finding of fact, rejected the contention that the accuracy of a proxy
statement is not in issue when a solicitor has majority control, observing
that "approval was not meaningless; minority shareholder approval has
value whether or not it is strictly essential to the power to act." 69
Although the court did not explicitly reject Barnett, its language clearly
appears at odds with the rationale of that case. Nevertheless, recent
decisions evidence a continuing conflict within the Second Circuit be-
tveen district courts in the Southern and the Eastern Districts of New
York.7 0
Implicit in the holding in Barnett is the assumption that formal voting
power is the only legal right at issue when a corporate vote is solicited.
The decision overlooks the significant role which minority shareholders
can play in preventing consummation of an objectionable transaction.
Although minority votes may be numerically insufficient to alter the
outcome of a vote, the minority shareholders have several means by
which they may cause a proposed transaction to be modified or even
abandoned. First, a dissident minority through the use or threat of
unfavorable publicity may dissuade management from an undesirable
course of action. 71 Second, through widespread exercise of appraisal
rights, 72 minority shareholders can prevent a merger by depleting the
corporate assets.7 3 A third method available to the minority stockholder
is legal action. Injunctions to preclude effectuation of a transaction
68. See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus. Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332 n.6 (7th Cir.
1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F.
Supp. 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
69. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. See Laufer v. Stranahan, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,617, at 98,774-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (In the "absence of binding authority," Barnett will be followed.).
71. See Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80
YALE L.J. 107, 143 (1970).
72. Many states permit shareholders in merging corporations to compel the corpora-
tions to pay the cash value of their shares if they do not care to hold stock in the new
corporation. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. § 910 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1973).
73. Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE
LJ. 107, 143-44 (1970). Moreover, a deceptive proxy may cause a shareholder to lose
appraisal rights. Various states consider these rights lost if a shareholder votes in
favor of. a proposal or if written objection to the transaction is not filed prior to
the vote. Id. at 144.
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may be sought for violation of state laws 74 dealing with conflicts of
interest and corporate waste.
Adoption of the Barnett rationale in effect sanctions violations of
proxy rules in those instances in which a majority shareholder need
not solicit additional votes. The language of section 14(a), however,
proscribes defective solicitation in all cases, not merely in instances in
which additional votes are needed to accomplish a corporate transac-
tion. Limiting the plain meaning of the section is inconsistent with its
underlying policy. It is therefore submitted that material infringement
of shareholder suffrage rights should be subject to redress in every
instance. The controlling issue is whether a proxy statement accurately
and fully discloses the proposal to be voted upon, not whether a trans-
action could be accomplished in the absence of shareholder solicitation.
An extension of Mills to encompass solicitations by controlling share-
holders would effectuate the objectives of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and provide the protection to investors envisioned by the
Supreme Court in Borak.
In summary, Mills clarified the prerequisites to establishment of a
cause of action predicated on violations of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9.
If proxies are solicited using means which render the proxy materials
false or misleading, a cause of action is stated if the defect is material.75
Materiality is established if a false or misleading statement or omission
has a significant propensity to affect a reasonable shareholder who is in
the process of deciding how to vote. This should be true whether or not
a solicitor owns sufficient shares to approve a proposal.
Once a cause of action is stated, the issue becomes to what relief an
aggrieved shareholder is entitled. Effectuation of the preventive and
remedial purposes of the proxy rules requires that appropriate relief be
available once conduct is found to contravene the rules.
74. E. ARAiow & H. Ewnoat, Paoxv CONTESrS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 481-88 (2d
ed. 1968).
75. In Puma v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18 (D. Del. 1972), the court stated that a
violation is established when a proxy solicitation contains false or misleading state-
ments or omits necessary facts, if such statements or omissions are material. Other
courts still address the elements necessary to state a section 14(a) cause of action in
pre-Mills terms, that is, materiality, damage, and causal connection between the
proxy statement and damage. E.g., Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). However, when the Mills criteria are applied, it becomes evident that materiality
is the essence of a violation. See, e.g., Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 173-74 (S.D.
Iowa 1970).
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FASHIONING APPROPRIATE RELIEF
The Supreme Court in Borak sanctioned the use of retrospective (post-
vote) as well as prospective (prevote) relief for violations of the
proxy rules. The forms of relief articulated most frequently are in-
junction, rescission, and compensatory damages. The latter two, which
are, by definition, retrospective, will be tested in terms of their efficacy
to redress a violation after pro.des have been voted. Injunctive relief
may be preventive, in the form of a prohibitory injunction, or repara-
tive, as is the case with a mandatory injunction; thus, its utility must be
analyzed in prevote and postvote contexts. In addition to these estab-
lished forms of relief, punitive damages and an award of attorneys' fees
will be discussed as potentially effective remedies.
The Limited Applicability of Damages
Norte & Co. v. Huffnes 6 is one of only two successful damage
actions predicated on a violation of rule 14a-9. At issue in this derivative
action was the fairness of the exchange ratio recommended by defendant
in a proxy solicitation which sought shareholder approval of the ex-
change. The court, after a determination that stock valued at $70.51
per share in the proxy materials was worth only $40.58, ruled that the
exchange ratio proposed in the proxy materials was materially misleading
in contravention of section 14(a); damages in excess of three million
dollars were awarded.
The other successful damage suit under section 14(a) is Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, h7C., 77 in which a minority stockholder of an outdoor
advertising corporation which had been merged into its dominating
majority shareholder brought suit for an accounting and restitution. The
liquidating value of the acquired corporation was significantly higher
than its net book value. The district court held that omission of the
appraised value of the properties of the merged corporation from the
proxy materials soliciting approval of the merger, coupled with de-
fendant's failure to disclose its plans to liquidate the acquired corpora-
tion soon after consummation of the merger, violated section 14(a) and
rule 14a-9. A special master was appointed to supervise the accounting.
76. 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
77. 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 332 F. Supp. 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
modified, 348 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd as modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.
1973).
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After two master's reports and two supplemental opinions by the district
court,78 plaintiff was awarded damages of twelve million dollars.79
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the dis-
trict court's finding that failure to disclose the appraisal values violated
section 14(a). ° The appellate court, however, held that the proxy
statements were materially misleading in failing adequately to disclose
the intent of the acquiring corporation to sell the merged company's
assets soon after consummation.8' Although a violation was found, the
formula approved by the district court to compute prejudgment in-
terest on damages was rejected and the case remanded for final de-
termination of the amount of damages consistent with guidelines out-
lined by the appellate court.8 2 The ten years which have passed since
consummation of the merger demonstrate the "endless delay" inherent
in arriving at a damage figure, a factor which cannot be overlooked in
considering the efficacy of compensatory damages as a remedy for vio-
lations of the proxy rules. s3
78. For the district court's reaction to the master's first report, see Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 644 (ED.N.Y. 1971) (decree that a different ac-
counting formula should be used). The second master's report, issued January 31,
1972, likewise failed to resolve the issue of damages. In an opinion modifying the
master's findings, the court expressed its "disapproval and disappointment in the
endless delay in the rendition by the defendant of the final accounting." The plaintiff
was also reprimanded for "unreasonable, exaggerated and unsupportable claims." Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 979, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
79. Both parties took exception to the formula approved by the district court judge
for the computation of damages. For a summary of the progression of this litigation
through the district court, see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1289-91
(2d Cir. 1973).
80. The court made reference to established policy at the time of the 1963 merger
and found that inclusion of asset appraisal in a proxy statement was consistently dis-
approved: "It has long been an article of faith among lawyers specializing in the
securities field that appraisals of assets could not be included in a proxy statement."
Id. at 1293.
81. Id. at 1295-98.
82. The district court had imposed prejudgment interest on the sum of the net
proceeds on the sales of the merged company's plants and the value of the minority
stockholders' shares in the unsold assets at the time of merger. The appellate court
considered such an award too severe and reduced it by the sum of the value of the
convertible preferred shares in the surviving corporation, dividends received on such
shares, and five percent interest on the dividends. In effect, interest was to be com-
puted only on the excess of the value of the share of the assets of the merged corporation
held by its minority stockholders over the value of the convertible preferred stock
of the surviving corporation from the date of merger to the date of judgment. Id.
at 1307.
83. The court of appeals asserted that three separate district court opinions plus
two reports by a special master concerning computation of the damage award "attest
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Although Gerstle and Huffnes represent successful damage actions
for violations of the proxy rules,s4 they involved transactions unlaw-
fully accomplished to the financial detriment of the plaintiff share-
holders. In asserting in Mills that damages may be recovered only to
the extent that they can be shown,85 the Supreme Court suggested two
situations in which monetary relief would be appropriate: first, when
the defective proxy materials relate to specific terms in a proposed
merger, and, second, when the merger reduces the earnings or earnings
potential of a stockholder's investment.86 The Court further noted that
if, as a result of commingling of the assets and operations of the merged
companies, the establishment of direct financial injury is impossible,
"relief might be predicated on a determination of the fairness of the
terms of the merger at the time it was approved." 87
Inability to establish direct financial injury or to demonstrate that
the terms of a transaction were unfair, however, need not preclude a
determination that the shareholders have been injured. The Supreme
Court has stated that fraudulent substitution of shareholder status in one
corporation for an identical status in another "may constitute a cog-
nizable legal injury in and of itself." s If false or misleading statements
or omissions are used to obtain proxies in support of a merger, or, in-
deed, any corporate proposal, shareholders have been deprived of the
full disclosure and informed vote which is their statutory right. It is
submitted that inadequate disclosure which materially infringes upon
a stockholder's suffrage rights is a cognizable legal injury, even though
damage analysis may be inapplicable.89
to the problems which the recognition of a private right of action for violation of
5 14(a) in [Borak] have thrust upon the federal courts . . . ." Id. at 1284.
84. The two cases represent the only successful damage actions predicated on viola-
tions of section 14(a).
85. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970).
86. Id. at 388-89.
87. Id. at 389. The Court emphasized that its "singling out of some of the possibili-
ties is not intended to exclude others." Id. However, it appears clear that damages
cannot be shown in transactions which are nonfinancial in nature or in those which
are unlawfully consummated but financially "fair" to the stockholders.
88. SEC v. National See, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969). Although the defendant
in this case was charged with violating SEC Rule 10b-5, it is submitted that the Court's
rationale is applicable to section 14(a) actions.
89. The Supreme Court in Mills observed that "[ulse of a solicitation that is ma-
terially misleading is itself a violation of law . . . ." 396 U.S. at 383 (1970). The
Court, although recognizing that private suits to enforce the proxy rules benefit the
corporation, warned: "in many suits under § 14(a), particularly where the violation
does not relate to the terms of the transaction for which proxies are solicited, it may
be impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit." Id. at 396. Plaintiffs should
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It appears that the appropriateness of compensatory relief is limited
to those transactions which have direct adverse effects upon the financial
concerns of the shareholder. When proxies are unlawfully solicited in
support of liquidation, consolidation, merger, or sale, lease, or exchange
of assets, damages may be recovered to the extent that they can be
shown. In other situations, measurement of pecuniary loss to share-
holders for violations of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 is difficult, if not
impossible.9
Proxy solicitations to obtain approval for nonfinancial proposals,9
nevertheless, may deprive a shareholder of his right to exercise an in-
formed vote if the facts of the proposal are not fully and accurately
disclosed. Reliance on money damages to remedy proxy violations hav-
ing no direct financial consequences, however, is misplaced;02 more
importantly, such reliance may frustrate the purpose of the proxy
rules.93
recognize the difficulty that inheres in measuring shareholder injury in monetary terms
in situations which do not relate to the terms of a transaction or which do not reduce
the shareholder's earnings or the earnings potential of his holdings. It is submitted
that a damage suit is proper only in those instances in which the proxy violation is,
or may be, financially detrimental to the plaintiff. In other situations, a suit for
rescissional or injunctive relief is appropriate.
90. In Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), the district court stated: "The damages the
stockholder incurs in compelling rectification of, a misleading statement would seem
to be recoverable from the person who violated the federal statute, but in the absence
of such an expense the intrusion of misleading statements into the process of stockholder
suffrage is impossible to measure in monetary damages." 140 F. Supp. at 513. One
commentator has suggested that the "likelihood of damage actions is probably more
theoretical than real." Folk, Cizil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 199, 248 (1969).
91. For purposes of this discussion, "nonfinancial" transactions refer to those pro-
posals voted upon at a shareholder meeting which have only indirect financial conse-
quences. Included are elections of directors, amendments to corporate charter, and
changes in and additions to the corporation's by-laws. "Financial transactions" en-
compass those which may directly affect the equity holdings of a shareholder. Prime
examples are corporate liquidations, consolidations, and mergers.
92. See note 89 supra.
93. The purpose of the proxy rules is to ensure the integrity of the proxy solicita-
tion process by requiring full and accurate disclosure by the solicitor. See notes 4-5
supra. An attempt to recover compensatory damages in nonfinancial transactions will
be defeated, whether or hot a violation of the rules has been established. For example,
a plaintiff may allege and prove a material violation of the proxy rules with respect
to the election of a board of directors. Because the transaction unlawfully accomplished
had no adverse financial effect on the plaintiff/shareholder, damages will not lie.
Unless an alternative remedy is fashioned, an activity proscribed by the Act will in
effect be sanctioned for lack of an appropriate remedy.
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The questionable efficacy of compensatory damages in situations in
which the plaintiff cannot establish that he was injured financially, to-
gether with the "endless delays" inherent in arriving at an award even
when damage analysis is applicable, suggests the need for an alternative
remedy to ensure a system of full and accurate disclosure. Within the
context of those proposals which directly involve the finances of the
corporation but do not adversely affect a shareholder's investment and
hence provide no basis for a damage award, rescission may be a viable
alternative. The prospects for such relief to unwind corporate financial
transactions, however, is dismal.
The Improbability of Rescissional Relief
The availability of rescissional relief to remedy rule 14a-9 violations
in the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions is firmly estab-
lishedY4 The deterrent effect of such a remedy also is beyond dispute.95
Unfortunately, the implications of these propositions are more theoretical
than real; to date no merger has been rescinded to redress a violation of
the proxy rules.
Although affirming that rescission is a possible remedy for violations
of the proxy rules, the Supreme Court in Mills stated that a proven
violation does not mandate automatic rescission of a merger: "[N] othing
in the statutory policy 'requires the court to unscramble a corporate
transaction merely because a violation occurred.'" 16 The Court noted
that equitable principles must control the decision whether to rescind
and that the fairness of the merger terms, although not a defense to a
section 14(a) action 9 7 is a determinative factor in fashioning an appro-
priate remedy. 8 On remand, the district court refused to rescind the
94. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964). The discussion of the availability of rescissional relief will be
limited to the context of mergers, consolidations, and liquidations. In the case of non-
financial transactions unlawfully consummated, the mandatory injunction is the ap-
propriate equitable remedy.
95. The remedial effect of rescission is obvious. Transactions accomplished by
unlawful means could be declared void and a resolicitation ordered. If a solicitor
knew that mergers accomplished in contravention of rule 14a-9 would be declared
void, more vigorous efforts would be made to ensure full and accurate disclosure in
all solicitations.
96. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970) (citation omitted).
97. The holding of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Mills that fair-
ness was a defense was reversed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 381-85.
98. id. at 386-S8. See also Swanson v. American Consumer Indus, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326
(7th Cir. 1969). In addition to the fairness of the merger terms, courts are likely to
consider the time elapsed since the merger, the nature of the transaction, shareholder
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merger, stating that "if it can be shown that plaintiffs suffered any in-
jury by reason of the merger they may be adequately compensated by
money damages." 99
Ironically, the same "fairness" of the merger terms which contributes
to the decision not to rescind will render proof of monetary loss virtu-
ally impossible. The practical effect of an emphasis on the damage/
rescission analysis in many situations is preclusion of relief for a proven
violation of the proxy rules. One commentator has suggested that "if
the courts so employ their equitable discretion, Mills will have raised
false hopes of greater protection for shareholders-having assured them
a technical judgment of liability, it may be cited to support the denial
of any tangible economic relief." 100
It is submitted that the inevitable delay between consummation of a
merger and judicial resolution of the controversy, as well as the practical
difficulties inherent in unwinding a merger, will appear with sufficient
frequency to ensure that rescission under section 14(a) remains only
theoretically available. It can, of course, be argued that the improba-
bility of rescission is irrelevant, since its threat sufficiently deters proxy
abuse. Nevertheless, the potency of the threat is substantially dimin-
ished by the fact that rescission has yet to be employed as a remedy for
section 14(a) violations. The failure of rescission as an effective remedy
for proxy abuses further suggests the need to develop a new approach
to enforcing the proxy solicitation rules.
Other Potential Forms of Relief
Although there are no cases on point under section 14 (a), the issue of
punitive damages'' has been discussed with respect to other sections of
preference, delay in instituting suit, and the adverse effect of rescission on innocent
third parties. For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Note, Causation and Liability
in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YAm L.J. 107, 128 n.86 (1970). For a
discussion of the difficulties that inhere in unwinding a merger, see Basch v. Talley
Indus. Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9, 14 (SD.N.Y. 1971).
99. CGH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,354, at 91,900 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
100. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 211, 214 (1970).
101. Punitive or exemplary damages are generally defined or described as damages
allowed or awarded as a punishment to the defendant and as an example to deter him
and others from committing similar offenses in the future. W. PRossER, Tim LA-v oF
ToRTs § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
The possibility of punitive damages should be limited to those violations of section
14(a) and rule 14a-9 which involve financial proposals and for which rescission and
damages are inappropriate. Violations involving nonfinancial proposals may be ade-
quately redressed by mandatory injunction. See note 180 infra & accompanying text.
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the securities acts. 1 2 Recent opinions have cited section 28 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act'0 3 and policy considerations underlying the se-
curities legislation'14 as factors militating against the awarding of puni-
tive damages for securities law violations.
In Green v. Wolf Corp.,105 an action under SEC Rule lob-5106 alleging
the use of false and misleading prospectuses, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that punitive damages may not be recovered
for any claim arising under the Securities Exchange Act. The court
relied upon the express language of section 28,107 which provides:
"[N] o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the pro-
visions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual dam-
ages .... " 108
In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,109 however, the trial court held
that section 28 precludes the recovery of exemplary damages only in
suits involving causes of action specifically authorized by the Securities
Exchange Act. Where the cause of action is one which is implied from
the Act, such as that in deHaas under rule 10b-5, the court reasoned
that general tort principles should apply."!0 Although reversing the
102. Cases denying punitive damages include Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.
1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (dictum); Pappas v. Moss, 257
F. Supp. 345 (D.NJ. 1966); Mills v. Sarijem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
The possibility of exemplary relief was recognized in Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum); Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445(N.D. Ohio 1964) (dictum).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
104. For an extensive analysis of policy considerations, see Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive
Damage Awards Under the Federal Securities Acts, 47 NorE DAME L. Rzv. 72, 82-87
(1971); Note, Punitive Damages In Implied Private Actions for Fraud Under the
Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 646 (1970). See also Note, Causation and Liability
in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YmAx L.J. 107, 130-35 (1970), in which the
author suggests that the Supreme Court in Mills was arguing against the use of
exemplary damages when it stated that "damages should be recoverable only to the
extent that they can be shown." 396 U.S. at 389.
105. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
107. Commentaries favoring this approach include Note, Remedies for Private Parties
Undc Rule Ob-5, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 337 (1969); Comment, Punitive Damages
in Implied Civil Actions Under the Securities Acts, 74 DiCm. L. REV. 466 (1970);
Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule lOb-, 20 Sw. LJ. 620 (1966). But
see Note, Punitive Damages In Implied Private Actions For Fraud Under the Securities
Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 646 (1970).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
109. 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), revg 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
110. A similar approach has been taken under other federal statutes. See, e.g., In re
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decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
declined to rule that section 28 is a bar to punitive damages,"' choosing
instead to base disallowance on policy considerations. The factors which
the court found to militate against allowance of punitive damages were
similar to those considered by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc." 2 in holding that an
action under section 17 (a) of the Securities Act" 3 could not support
an award of punitive damages. Although recognizing that exemplary
relief would deter violations, the Globus court observed that plaintiffs
under the securities acts "already possess an extensive 'arsenal of weap-
ons' which serve to perform the functions of retribution and deter-
rence." .14 It was noted that private actions for compensatory damages
"often lead to sizable recoveries and to considerable deterrent clout." I
To add punitive damages to this arsenal, the court suggested, would
provide only a marginal deterrent effect but result in potentially ex-
tensive hardship to the defendant.
A similar balancing approach was utilized in deHaas. The court
noted that sanctions for violation of the Securities Exchange Act in-
clude a maximum fine of $10,000,116 two years' imprisonment, or both,
Den Norshe Amerikanlinje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (Jones Act);
Wills v. Trans World Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (Federal Aviation
Act).
111. In a subsequent decision, the court held that section 28 does not bar punitive
damages where a common law fraud claim is joined under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction to an action under the securities acts. In Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329
(10th Cir. 1972), the court sustained a punitive damage award in a suit brought under
rule 10b-5, Utah blue sky laws, and common law fraud theories, stating:
By so construing the statute, effect is given both to the statute's policy for
preserving state remedies and to some limitation on damages recoverable.
A reasonable limiting effect is given by interpreting § 28(a) as meaning
that if a federal claim is maintained as here, recovery of actual damages
tvice on separate claims in the action is prohibited, but that if the elements
of a state claim are necessarily found to exist, punitive damages and at-
torney's fees allowed under state law are not barred.
Id. at 1338.
112. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
114. 418 F.2d at 1285.
115. Id.
116. Several authors, however, have argued that such penalty is insignificant, noting
that when a violation results in large gains, a $10,000 fine is a small cost to pay. 2 A.
BROMBERG, SEcUmTns LAw: FaAUD § 10.3 (1971); Comment, Fashioning a Lid For Pan-
dora's Box: A Legitimate Role for Rule lOb-I in Private Actions Against Insider Trades
on a National Stock Exchange, 16 U.CJ.AJL. Rtv. 404 (1969).
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for willful violations, 117 as well as possible suspension of trading"" or
expulsion from a national securities exchange." 9 A factor emphasized
in deHaas was the liberalization of class actions,12 0 with the result that
"the overall size of compensatory damages alone may constitute a sig-
nificant deterrent." '21
These basic policy considerations, especially the last, although per-
haps applicable in other contexts of securities law violations, do not
appear to have the same force with respect to section 14(a). The civil
suit for compensatory damages provides one of the weakest deterrents
to violations of the proxy rules. Only when a transaction proves finan-
cially detrimental to the shareholders are substantial money damages
recoverable. Consequently, courts seeking to realize the full deterrent
potential of the section 14(a) private remedy should not overlook the
possibility of awarding punitive damages in limited circumstances.
Another form of relief, and one applied by the Supreme Court in
Mills, is the awarding to plaintiff of his attorneys' fees. Theorizing that
the corporation as a whole benefitted from plaintiff's suit and accord-
ingly should share in the cost of the litigation, the Mills Court, on its
own initiative, held that plaintiff could recover his attorneys' fees from
the defendant corporation upon establishing a violation of section 14(a)
by the corporation and its officers. 22 Whether such an approach re-
dresses the actual violation or deters future abuses, however, is doubtful.
It is submitted that a stronger deterrent to future proxT abuse would
obtain if the solicitor were held personally liable for the costs incurred
by the shareholder in bringing the action. Although few courts have
considered the standard to be applied in determining personal culpa-
bility for violations of section 14(a), the trend is toward one of negli-
gence. In Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co.,' 2' for example,
the court rejected tests involving scienter and strict liability in favor of
a negligence standard. 2 Directors of the corporation were held per-
117. Securities Exchange Act § 32 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
118. Id. 5§ 15(b) (5)-(7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b) (5)-(7) (1970).
119. Id. § 19(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1970).
120. See generally 2 A. BROAMERG, SECuRmES LAW: FRaum § 11.6 (1971); 6 L. Loss,
SEcuRrTIES REGULATION 3938-70 (1969 Supp. to 2d ed.); Comment, Adequate Represen-
tation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the
Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. RFv. 889 (1968).
121. 435 F.2d at 1231.
122. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970).
123. 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
124. The negligence standard has been approved in at least three other jurisdic-
tions. See Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Gerstle v. Gamble-
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sonally liable for shareholder injury resulting from defects in proxy
materials attributable to their negligence. 25
A logical extension of Gould is to charge attorneys' fees to anyone
directly responsible for an unlawful solicitation if, due to his negligence,
the proxy statement was materially false or misleading. To hold a so-
licitor to strict liability would actually discourage full and accurate dis-
closure, since liability might attach regardless of how conscientious the
effort to comply with the proxy rules. To require actual knowledge of
misstatements or omissions would prompt the solicitor to remain unin-
formed as to the completeness or accuracy of the proxy literature, with
the result that the quality of the materials would suffer for lack of
effective supervision in their preparation. The negligence standard
would thus appear preferable; nevertheless, the efficacy of an award of
attorneys' fees to redress proxy solicitation abuses and to deter future
violations remains questionable.
In summary, neither compensatory damages nor rescission has proved
an effective remedy for violations of the proxy rules. The possibility
of punitive damages appears slight, in light of the judicial reluctance to
award them in other contexts of securities law violations; an award of
attorneys' fees would be of questionable efficacy either as a remedy or as
a deterrent. 26 It is apparent that the injunction remains the potentially
most effective means of protecting the rights of shareholders to the full
disclosure and intelligent suffrage which section 14(a) was designed to
ensure.127
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Ci. 1973);
Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
125. In Gould, proxies solicited to gain shareholder approval for a merger of McLean
Industries into R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. were alleged to be false and misleading in
their failure to disclose that certain "favored" shareholders had veto power over the
merger. The materials had stated falsely that these favored shareholders, who were to
receive cash while the other stockholders were to receive securities, had agreed to vote
in favor of the merger.
126. To shareholders with sufficient financial resources to render the threat of pro-
longed litigation believable, the motion for summary judgment may prove an effective
means of achieving redress. If a violation is established, the defendant in many instances
will choose to settle the case rather than suffer unfavorable publicity and additional
expense in further litigation. This procedure, however, seemingly circumvents the
mandate of the Supreme Court in Borak that the courts fashion appropriate remedies
for violations of the proxy rules. See note 12 supra. Moreover, any deterrent effect on
future abuses is doubtful.
127. Undoubtedly, rescission and damages have theoretical potential as means of
redressing proxy rule violations. It is the limited circumstances in which such remedies
have proved applicable and their inability to forestall abuses which must be recognized.
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The Need for a Realistic Approach to Injunctive Relief
Variously classified according to the nature of the decree 128 and the
stage of litigation at which issuance occurs, 129 the injunction has been
recognized as the primary enforcement device of the securities laws.30
Section 21 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to
bring suit in the federal district courts to enjoin activities which "con-
stitute or will constitute" violations of the Act.'' Although the SEC
has proven itself a formidable litigator in obtaining injunctions,'3 2 courts
have been reluctant to afford relief in a similar form to individuals.
Traditional judicial reluctance to invoke the extraordinary remedy of
injunction is nowhere more apparent than in private actions to enjoin
threatened violations of rule 14a-9.133
The present state of the law is indeed troubling. Although the
Supreme Court has held that private rights exist to prevent abuse in
proxy solicitations, subsequent decisions have demonstrated the limited
availability of damages and the improbability of rescissional relief. The
reluctance to afford injunctive relief renders private enforcement rights
practically nugatory. 3 4
128. Injunctions are either preventive or reparative. The preventive (prohibitory)
injunction orders a defendant to refrain from pursuing a course of conduct or to
abstain from the accomplishment of an act. Reparative (mandatory) injunctions
require a defendant to take some affirmative action. See generally W. DEFuNiAK,
HAN'oooK OF MODERN EQUITY 16-17 (1950); Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the
Injunction Bond, 73 HARv. L. REv. 333, 334 (1959).
129. The preliminary or temporary injunction attempts to preserve the status quo
pending final determination of the parties' rights. Issuance occurs after notice to the
adverse party and an initial hearing not on the merits. The temporary restraining
order serves a purpose similar to that of the temporary injunction but issues ex parte.
Permanent relief is afforded only after a full hearing on the merits. W. DEFoNiAK,
supra note 128, at 17-19. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
130. See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972),
in which the court observed that the securities laws are "a classic example of modem
utilization of traditional equity jurisdiction for the enforcement of a congressionally
declared public policy administered by a regulatory agency established for that pur-
pose:' Id. at 53.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
132. See note 14 supra.
133. See, e.g., Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kauder
v. United Board & Carton Corp, 199 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
134. It should be noted that the inability of the SEC to deal effectively with the
rapidly increasing number of proxy statements filed annually was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Borak as one reason why private enforcement was necessary. See
note 9 supra.
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Present Availability
Courts faced with the question whether an injunction should issue
for violations of the securities laws have distinguished actions brought
by the SEC from those instituted by individual shareholders13 on the
basis that Commission actions protect the public interest while share-
holder suits seek to protect interests jeopardized in private controver-
sies.136 It is clear that when the public interest is involved, the equitable
powers of a court are more flexible than in a private dispute. 3 7 It is not
surprising, therefore, that a stricter burden of proof is required of the
private plaintiff seeldng injunctive relief. To prevail, an individual must
establish the common law elements of threatened irreparable harm and
the absence of an adequate remedy at law. The SEC, on the other hand,
need meet only the statutory requirement of a "proper showing." The
stricter standard applied by courts when the plaintiff is a private party
135. The fundamental distinction is that between statutory and common law in-
junctions. If an action is instituted pursuant to a statutory right, only the statutory
requirements need be met. The typical statutory requirement of a "proper showing"
thus does not include the need to establish the common law elements of threatened
irreparable harm or the absence of. an adequate remedy at law. See SEC v. Lake
Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (D. Minn. 1972) (irreparable injury not re-
quired for a statutory injunction); SEC v. Liberty Petroleum Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93,209 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (no need to show irreparable harm or inadequacy of
other remedies).
In United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1972), the court
construed the injunction section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
requires the same "proper showing" found in the Securities Exchange Act. It was ob-
served that "[n]o specific or immediate showing of the precise way in which violation
of the law will result in public harm is required. . . . [The defendant's] claim that
.. . there was no showing of irreparable injury . . . is beside the point." Id. at 28.
For a discussion of the use of the statutory injunction, see Note, The Statutory In-
junction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE L.J. 1023 (1948).
For a detailed discussion of SEC enforcement activities, see Pitt & Markham, SEC
Injunctive Actions, 6 REv. OF SEC. RFG. 955 (1973).
136. The differences between public and private injunctive actions are widely
acknowledged. See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th
Cir. 1972); Mitchell v. Pidcock, 299 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1962). In United States
v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1972), the court observed that
"the function of a court in deciding whether to issue an injunction authorized by a
statute of the United States to enforce and implement Congressional policy is a differ-
ent one from that of the court when weighing claims of two private litigants." But
see Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of ]1. Case v. Borak, 12
U.CL.A.L. REv. 1150, 1174 (1965).
137. See Bradford v. SEC, 278 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Liberty Petroleum
Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,209 (N.D. Ohio 1971); SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc,
240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULAMTON 1979
(2d ed. 1961).
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partially explains the limited success of shareholders who have sought
injunctive relief for alleged violations of proxy solicitation requirements.
SEC Actions
In instituting an action for a permanent injunction, the SEC need
only "establish that the acts or practices are in contravention with the
statute ... ," 13s It has been stated that an "affirmative showing of
threatened irreparable injury to the plaintiff or the public is not essen-
tial beyond that which will be implied as a natural result from any
failure to appropriately prevent threatened violations." 19 What is es-
sential is a showing that there exists a reasonable likelihood of future
violations.140 Moreover, it has been held that previous violations give
rise to an inference that future violations may be likely; mere cessa-
tion of unlawful conduct will not dispel this inference. 141
When preliminary relief is sought, the SEC must establish a "strong
prima facie case." 142 In SEC 'v. Lake Havasu Estates,143 this vague
standard was clarified somewhat by the court's observation that a viola-
tion itself "establishes a prima facie case for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction." 144 The crucial inquiry in the establishment of a prima facie
138. SEC v. Liberty Petroleum Corp, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,209, at 91,347
(ND. Ohio 1971).
139. SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co, 167 F. Supp. 248, 261 (D. Utah
1958). That irreparable harm need not be established is clear from the case law. E.g.,
United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1972); Bradford
v. SEC, 278 F.2d 566, 567 (9th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir.
1937); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (D. Minn. 1972); SEC v.
Liberty Petroleum Corp, CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 93,209, at 91,347 (N.D. Ohio 1971);
SEC v. Northeastern Financial Corp., 268 F. Supp. 412, 414 (D.N.J. 1967); SEC v.
Broadwall Sec., Inc, 240 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
140. In SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972),
it was noted: "The critical question for a district court in deciding whether to issue
a permanent injunction in view of past violations is whether there is a reasonable like-
lihood that the wrong will be repeated." See also SEC v. Liberty Petroleum Corp.,
CCH FED. Ssc. L. REP. 93,209, at 91,347 (ND. Ohio 1971).
141. SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
972 (1970); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1959). For cases holding
that an inference of future violations is properly drawn from the finding of past mis-
conduct, see SEC v. Keller Corp, 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Boren,
283 F.2d 312, 313 (2d Cir. 1960).
142. SEC v. Boren, 283 F.2d 312, 313 (2d Cir. 1960); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates,
340 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (D. Minn. 1972); SEC v. Broadwall See., Inc., 240 F. Supp.
962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
143. 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
144. Id. at 1324.
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case is whether there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant's actions
would thwart the policy of the securities laws.145
For various reasons, including liberal statutory requirements and the
public nature of the action, courts have received favorably SEC en-
forcement actions. 14 6 Injunctions have been granted to prevent the
solicitation of proxies, 147 to enjoin the use of unlawfully solicited
proxies, 4 1 to postpone and adjourn annual shareholder meetings,4 0 to
declare proxies void and order a resolicitation, 50 and to enjoin future
violations.' These actions clearly illustrate the flexibility of injunctive
relief' 52 and the protection it can afford to the integrity of the voting
process. That this salutory effect could be enhanced if individual share-
holders were afforded the same ready access to injunctive relief is ap-
parent.
Shareholder Injunctive Actions
In most cases in which individual shareholders allege violation of the
proxy rules, interlocutory relief is sought. 5 To be successful, the plain-
tiff must establish three elements: that a fair probability of success on
the merits exists, that the threatened harm is irreparable, and that the
harm sought to be averted by the plaintiff is commensurate with the
resultant harm to the defendant should relief be granted.114
145. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Commonwealth
Security Investors, Inc., CCH FFD. Sxc. L. REP. 92,859 (ED. Ky. 1970).
146. Statistics illustrating the Commission's success are provided in note 14 supra.
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Okin, 139 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1943).
148. SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir.
1956); SEC v. Transamerica Corp, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
847 (1948); SEC v. O'Hara Re-election (or Proxy) Committee, 28 F. Supp. 523 (D.
Mass. 1939).
149. Henwood v. SEC, 298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962).
150. See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 847 (1948).
151. See, e.g., SEC v. Rusco Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,144 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
152. It should be noted that SEC injunctive actions, although at times reparative,
usually are preventive in effect.
153. It is not uncommon for an action to be brought less than a week prior to the
shareholder meeting at which the solicited proxies are to be voted. Insufficient time
to resolve the issues on the merits prior to the meeting date necessitates a request for
threshold relief. See, e.g., Committee for New Management of Butler Aviation v.
Widmark, 335 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (action brought on the "eve" of the
meeting).
154. See, e.g., Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Although failure to demonstrate a fair probability of success on the
merits occasionally has precluded issuance of an injunction,'55 refusal
to enjoin more often is predicated upon an absence of irreparable harm.'56
One authority defines irreparable harm as "that which cannot be re-
paired, restored or adequately compensated in money or where the com-
pensation cannot be safely measured." 'r7 Notwithstanding the limited
applicability of damages and the improbability of rescissional relief as a
means of redressing section 14(a) violations, 55 the availability and ef-
ficacy of such remedies apparently is frequently assumed by courts in
finding an absence of irreparable harm.' One commentator, discussing
the implications of Borak, has suggested that the "practical difficulties
encountered in awarding postconsummation relief may lead to greater
leniency in the awarding of temporary injunctive relief .... However,
the availability of postconsummation relief may as plausibly lead to re-
luctance to enjoin corporate activity." 160
It would appear that the theoretical availability of rescission has con-
tributed to judicial reluctance to enjoin the use of proxies solicited in
support of corporate merger. In Sherman v. Posner,161 for example, the
court declined to enjoin consummation of an exchange offer approved
at a shareholder meeting allegedly as a result of an unlawful solicitation.
It was reasoned that the threatened harm was far from irreparable since
retrospective relief was available, the court stating that "there is suf-
ficient authority in this District which would permit the setting aside of
the merger and consolidation and re-solicitation to be had with a new
vote held thereon." 162 The authorities referred to by the court had not
actually afforded rescission but only stated that such relief was possible.
Although reasoning which establishes the existence of a remedy in terms
155. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970);
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Lewis, 334 F. Supp. 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
156. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 458 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1972); Greater Iowa
Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 799 (8th Cir. 1967); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc,
312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 888 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Weeks v. Alpert, 131 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1955).
157. V. DEFumAK, supra note 128, at 35.
158. See notes 84-93 & 94-100 supra & accompanying text.
159. E.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 458 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1972).
160. Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits Under Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, 18 STAN. L. Rzv. 1339, 1347 (1966). See also Note, Private
Rcmedies Available Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55
IOWA L. REv. 657, 664 (1970).
161. 266 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
162. Id. at 873-74.
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of its permissibility is often sound, such an approach is tenuous in this
context. The fact that rescission has never been employed to redress
a violation of section 14(a) suggests that its availability is more illusory
than real.'63
Frequently coinciding with a finding of an absence of threatened ir-
reparable harm is the belief that there exists an adequate remedy at law.
"By adequate remedy at law is meant one which is as speedy, efficient
and complete as that which equity can afford, or in other words, as
practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administra-
tion as the remedy in equity." 16 4 Even beyond the limited applicability
of pecuniary relief in the context of proxy violations,'65 the protracted
Mills and Gerstle litigations raise serious doubts concerning the speedi-
ness of the remedy.'66 Therefore, although the remedy may be adequate
in a particular case, a detailed examination must be made in each instance
to determine its applicability.
A final determinant in the decision to grant the shareholder inter-
locutory relief is a finding that the threatened harm which the plaintiff
alleges is commensurate with the resulting harm to defendant should
injunctive relief be granted. In Committee for New Management of
Butler Aviation v. Widmark,167 for example, plaintiff sought to enjoin
the use of proxies solicited to elect a board of directors. In denying
relief, the court stated that if preliminary relief were granted on the
163. This is not to suggest that denial of rescissional relief has been an incorrect
result in any particular case. Reliance on an "illusory" remedy, however, to "enforce"
the disclosure requirements of the proxy rules frustrates the avowed remedial purpose
of the Act.
164. W. DEFuNmX, supra note 128, at 11.
165. See notes 84-93 supra & accompanying text.
166. In both cases, although the mergers at issue were consummated in 1963, the
seemingly endless litigation continues a decade later.
167. 335 F. Supp. 146, 152 (ED.N.Y. 1971). In this case, the fact that issuance of. a
temporary injunction might prejudice the stockholders against the defendant was
determinative in the decision not to enjoin the use of proxies which it was alleged
were solicited unlawfully. Other courts have balanced the respective pecuniary harms
which would result to the parties if an injunction were granted or denied. One com-
mentator, however, warns that too strict an application of a doctrine of balancing the
respective harms to the parties may lead to "placing the plaintiff's right to relief upon
a dollars and cents basis, whereby what to the plaintiff is a substantial right is lost
or irreparably injured simply because it does not approach in pecuniary amount the
loss or hardship that the defendant will suffer if relief is granted." W. DEFuN-Ami, supra
note 128, at 49.
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"eve" of the election, the harm to defendant would outweigh that to
plaintiff since issuance would be viewed by shareholders as a final de-
termination of defendant's wrongdoing. Although possible shareholder
prejudice should be considered, the court could have postponed
the meeting and, should the defendant have been subsequently vindi-
cated, ordered corrective measures if necessary to alleviate shareholder
fears. To deny injunctive relief on the basis of a contingency which
might never occur seems unwarranted.
Although the majority of shareholder suits for injunctive relief have
been unsuccessful, relief occasionally has been afforded. In Union Pacific
Railroad v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 68 shareholder vote on a
proposed merger was enjoined, the meeting postponed for at least 60
days, a new record date set, and a resolicitation ordered. Even though
plaintiff's demand was for a preliminary injunction, both parties were
afforded full opportunity to present their cases on the merits. Upon
finding that section 14(a) had been violated, the court, acting before
the Supreme Court decision in Borak, expressed doubt concerning its
ability to set aside a completed vote. It concluded, however, that even
if such a remedy were possible, plaintiff had shown irreparable harm
warranting immediate relief. 169
Union Pacific is the leading pre-Borak case affording injunctive relief
to a shareholder. After the decision in Borak, it was assumed that ready
access for individuals to various remedies would follow. It has been
shown that this hope did not materialize in the form of damages or
rescission. Shareholder success in obtaining injunctive relief has been
little better.
Since Borak, few cases have been reported granting relief in share-
holder injunction actions. In Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp.,170 the failure
of the defendant corporation to disclose, in proxy solicitation materials
utilized to gain approval for the reelection of the board, that its chief
officer had been convicted of bribery was found materially misleading
and therefore violative of section 14(a). Accordingly, the annual meet-
ing was adjourned to permit a resolicitation with the appropriate dis-
168. 226 F. Supp. 400 (ND. IMI. 1964).
169. In Union Pacific, plaintiff had argued that to permit the use of the illegally
obtained proxies would result in the defeat of the proposed merger. The court stated:
"To confirm this result and then set it aside would gain nothing." Id. at 413.
170. 334 F. Supp. 467 (SD.N.Y. 1971).
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closure. 7' In Dillon v. Scotten, Dillon Co.,172 it was held that solicitation
materials were materially false and misleading as to the status of two
members elected to the board of directors. In a reparative decree, the
proxies used at the meeting at which the directors were elected were de-
clared void and the former directors reinstated.
Dillon and Cooke illustrate the flexibility of the injunction; such cus-
tom-made relief serves both the preventive and remedial purposes of the
proxy rules. Nevertheless, a more typical result is the denial of injunctive
relief for failure to establish one or more of the common law require-
ments. The argument may be advanced, however, that holding the
shareholder to a stricter burden than that required of the SEC is un-
warranted when enforcement of the proxy rules is at issue. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Mills, the shareholder suit often benefits
the corporation as a whole. Accordingly, the distinction between public
and private interests is frequently tenuous when the shareholder seeks
to enforce compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 14(a).
In addition, if the individual's implied right to sue under section 14(a)
derives from the statute itself rather than the common law,173 the stand-
ards articulated in the injunction section of the Act arguably should con-
trol, and the plaintiff should prevail upon the same "proper showing"
required of the SEC.
To require a shareholder to meet criteria which often preclude his
efforts to prevent abuses in the proxy solicitation process seemingly
frustrates the policy expressed by the Supreme Court in Borak. How-
ever, the possibility for abuse should the individual's burden be lessened
171. For a recent decision granting preliminary relief, see Coalition to Advocate
Pub. Util. Responsibility v. Engels, CCH FED. SEc. L. RFP. 93,972 (D. Minn. 1973),
in which suit was brought to enjoin the defendant from changing a cumulative voting
requirement. The court concluded that preliminary relief was proper since plaintiff
had a fair chance of success on the merits, since there was a showing of threatened ir-
reparable harm, and since the harm to the defendant resulting from issuance would
be negligible because the status quo would be maintained pending resolution of the
propriety of defendant's action. See also Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1971) (proxies voided, meeting adjourned, and resolicitation
ordered); Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich.
1966) (production of shareholder list ordered, meeting postponed, and new record
date set).
172. 335 F. Supp. 566 (D. Del. 1971).
173. Compare 5 L. Loss, SEcuiur=s R GuLATION 2926 (1969 Supp. to 2d ed.) (a common
law right) 'with Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) (rights derive
from the Act).
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is evident. A strildng example is the proxy contest, in which the self-
interests of the opposing factions are manifest. Frivolous suits may be
brought to enjoin the voting of proxies simply to enable the plaintiff to
acquire additional shareholder support for his position. The possibility
that delaying tactics will be employed thus weigh in favor of retaining
the common law requirements for injunctive relief in private enforce-
ment actions under section 14(a).
Assuming that the individual's right to enforce the proxy rules stems
from the common law or that the possibility of nuisance suits necessitates
the use of the stricter burden, a realistic appraisal and application of the
common law elements should result in more frequent injunctive relief.
That the harm may be irreparable is clear in light of the frequent un-
availability of legal or other equitable remedies. Also evident is the fact
that no meaningful generalization can be made with respect to the avail-
ability of a particular remedy; the determination must be made on a case-
by-case basis. 1'7
Implicit in a finding that the threatened harm to a plaintiff is not ir-
reparable often is a refusal to recognize the loss of suffrage rights as a
cognizable legal injury.1'75 To disregard the seriousness of this injury,
especially when other relief is ineffective, frustrates the congressional
purpose of ensuring full disclosure. To permit accomplishment of cor-
porate transactions by deceptive means for lack of an adequate remedy
in effect validates activities proscribed by the statute.
Clearly, if the stockholder's right to informed suffrage is to be pro-
tected, appropriate enforcement measures must be available to prevent,
whenever possible, abuse in the solicitation process. Whether the in-
dividual's right of action is viewed as statutory or derived from the
common law, a basis for the issuance of an injunction arguably exists;
without question, ready access to injunctive relief should exist.
174. Similarly, no meaningful generalization can be made with respect to the severity
of a defendant's injury should an injunction issue; such determination must be made
on a case-by-case basis. Whatever harm is alleged by a defendant must be balanced
against the threatened harm to plaintiff and his chances for success on the merits. In
balancing the equities, little, if any, weight should be given the assertion by a defendant
that the granting of preliminary relief would prejudice a significant number of share-
holders into believing that the defendant was in fact guilty of wrongdoing. See note
167 supra & accompanying text. But see Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871, 874
(SD.N.Y. 1966).
175. See notes 88-89 supra & accompanying text.
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A SUGGESTED APPROACH IN PRIVATE ENFORCEM,1ENT AcTrIoNs
Establishment of a cause of action predicated upon violation of sec-
don 14(a) or rule 14a-9 requires that a misrepresentation in or omission
from a proxy statement be material. A finding of materiality should
follow from a showing that the defect would have a significant propen-
sity to influence a reasonable shareholder who is in the process of de-
ciding how to vote. The Supreme Court has held that where solicitation
of favorable proxies is necessary to gain approval for a proposal, no
further showing of causal relationship between the violation and share-
holder injury is required if "the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the
particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in
the accomplishment of the transaction." 176 It is submitted that this rule
should also encompass situations in which a proposal could have been
adopted without the solicitation of proxies. 17
The rights of the parties should be ascertained, whenever possible,
before proxies are voted. Resolution of a controversy at this point avoids
the protracted litigation characteristic of actions for postvote relief.178
Expedited procedures should be available to determine, prior to a vote,
the merits of allegations of proxy rule violations. If a violation is estab-
lished, a permanent injunction should issue. Typically, a decree would
enjoin future violations and the use of the questioned proxies, and a
resolicitation would be ordered.
The equity of such an approach is obvious. The shareholder's right
to be informed fully on matters requiring a corporate vote is guaranteed;
the resulting burden to the solicitor in terms of additional solicitation
costs is a direct result of his unlawful action. Disenfranchisement of in-
nocent investors whose proxies have been illegally solicited would be
improbable, since the decree can provide for postponement of the share-
holder meeting and order a new record date if necessary.
This result requires that the shareholder action be instituted not only
prior to the meeting at which the proxies are to be voted but sufficiently
prior thereto to permit a trial on the merits. Frequently, however, an
action seeking temporary relief will be brought immediately before a
scheduled meeting. As previously noted,179 courts have not been inclined
176. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co, 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
177. See notes 59-74 supra & accompanying text.
178. Typically, litigation involving securities transactions is fully defended. Cases
extending five, six, or even ten years are not uncommon. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
179. See notes 155-67 supra & accompanying text.
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to afford such interlocutory relief. Although it is not here suggested
that particular results have been incorrect, the judicial reluctance to
afford preliminary relief has made it unduly difficult to prevent the use
of proxies pending a determination of the validity of their solicitation.
When interlocutory relief is sought, courts should differentiate be-
tween financial and nonfinancial proposals, maldng a realistic appraisal
of the possibility in each case for effective relief after the proxies are
voted. Financial transactions unlawfully accomplished may result in an
action for damages but are exceedingly difficult to unwind. Nonfinan-
cial proposals infrequently, if ever, will result in pecuniary loss but may
be voided with relative ease.
A finding that a solicitation contravenes section 14(a) and rule 14a-9
warrants invalidation as a matter of course of a nonfinancial transaction
approved with the use of the unlawfully solicited proxies. 18 ° Conse-
quently, it would appear that irreparable harm generally will not result
from a refusal to enjoin the voting of proxies on a nonfinancial proposal.
In such case, mandatory injunctive relief invalidating the vote and order-
ing a resolicitation provides adequate protection to the proxy solicita-
tion process.
It is the area of corporate financial proposals, particularly the merger
situation, in which the need for a liberalized approach toward prelim-
inary relief is most pressing. A merger consummated in contravention
of the proxy rules is only voidable, not void. As Justice Harlan has
observed: "[T] he merger should be set aside only if a court of equity
concludes, from all the circumstances, that it would be equitable to do
so." 181 The difficulties inherent in rescinding a merger, especially after
the lapse of time generally required to try the case on the merits, renders
the remedy practically nugatory.
If the shareholder has suffered direct financial injury as a result of
the unlawfully consummated transaction or if he can demonstrate that
the terms of the merger were unfair to him, he may be able to recover
compensatory damages, although, as experience indicates, prolonged
litigation likely will be required to arrive at an award. There are, how-
180. See Dillon v. Scotten, Dillon Co., 335 F. Supp. 566 (D. Del. 1971), in which
proxies used to elect two members to a corporation's board of directors were declared
null and void, the former directors reinstated, and a resolicitation ordered. Dillon
represents the proper judicial response when proxies used to gain shareholder approval
for nonfinancial transactions are found to have been solicited in contravention of
section 14(a) and rule 14a-9.
181. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970); of. SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1969).
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ever, numerous instances in which the shareholder will be unable to
demonstrate the requisite financial injury. In such case, he will be left
with the possibility of being awarded his attorneys' fees, a form of relief
of doubtful efficacy either as a remedy for the infringement of his
suffrage rights or as a deterrent to future abuses.18 2 Although punitive
damages would appear to be an appropriate remedy in such circum-
stances, the judicial reluctance to permit such awards under other pro-
visions of the securities laws likely would preclude such relief for proxy
rule violations."" The unattractive prospect for effective relief after
consummation of a corporate financial transaction, and specifically of
a merger, is a factor courts must take into account in considering
whether the plaintiff has established that the threatened harm is irre-
parable.
It would appear that only infrequently will the possible harm to the
defendant should preliminary injunctive relief be afforded outweigh
the threatened harm to the plaintiff. In nonfinancial transactions,
maintenance of the status quo pending a determination of the validity
of a solicitation will not unduly injure the solicitor. Although where
a proxy contest is involved the possibility that the suit has been brought
for its nuisance value and as a delaying tactic must be considered, the
requirement of an injunction bond'84 can be used to prevent frivolous
suits and to afford adequate protection to the defendant.
Financial transactions involve the more serious question of whether
delay at the preconsummation stage might result in abandonment of the
proposal. The possibility that the opportunity for merger may be lost
if consummation is temporarily enjoined should be given great weight,
but this fact alone should not be dispositive. Differentiation between
arm's-length and non-arm's-length merger proposals appears warranted,
since it is unlikely that a brief delay in consummation of a non-arm's-
length merger would result in the abandonment of the proposal. The
possibility that time is of the essence in an arm's-length merger oppor-
tunity is greater; however, if the court finds sufficient probability that a
defect in the proxy statement is material and if postconsummation relief
is unlikely, an injunction should issue, notwithstanding possible loss of
the merger opportunity. In any case, the solicitor should be required to
make a clear and convincing showing that delay will in fact subvert the
182. See notes 122-25 supra & accompanying text.
183. See notes 101-21 supra & accompanying text.
184. Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HtAv. L. REv.
333 (1959).
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proposal; a mere allegation that the merger opportunity will or may be
lost should be insufficient to defeat the shareholder's action. Utilization
of injunction bonds in such circumstances also merits consideration.
One commentator, analyzing the antitrust implications of corporate
merger, has suggested that preliminary relief should be afforded when-
ever a proposed merger is challenged on antitrust grounds.'85 It is sub-
mitted that claimed abuse of the proxy solicitation process may require
similar judicial response, in light of the difficulties inherent in obtaining
relief once a merger is consummated. A restraining order, issued ex
parte, or a temporary injunction would maintain the status quo pending
the determination whether to require a resolicitation. Although each
case must necessarily be decided on its facts and the discretion of the
trial judge maintained, the need to enjoin seems compelling when the
defective solicitation will not directly affect a stockholder's equity and
therefore will not provide the basis for a subsequent damage award.
CONCLUSION
A liberalized approach to injunctive relief does not dictate the result
in a particular case; judicial discretion is maintained. Realistic appraisal
of the equities, however, should result in greater access to temporary
relief for the deserving shareholder while simultaneously providing the
flexibility necessary effectively to distinguish frivolous and nuisance
suits. The basic suggestion is for a change in emphasis; traditional re-
luctance to enjoin must be replaced with a cognizance of the need for
relief at the prevote stage to prevent the use of proxies allegedly so-
licited in violation of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9. Preliminary relief
results in maintenance of the status quo pending a determination of the
materiality of the alleged defects. Consequently, inequitable results can
be minimized while shareholder protection is enhanced.
185. Note, "Preliminary Preliminary" Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 82
YAm L.J. 155 (1972).
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